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Corporeal Concepts and Kinetic Semantics 
An Encounter With: 
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Corporeal Turn: An 
Interdisciplinary Reader, Charlottesville: Imprint  
Academic, 2009, 380 pages. 
 &  
Recent articles (2012) by M. Sheets-Johnstone 
CORIJN VAN MAZIJK 
 
What is “the corporeal turn”? According to Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone, it is a broad interdisciplinary development concerning 
questions, concepts, and relationships that derive from and center on the 
body and bodily life. Not only does the term make implicit reference to the 
well-known “linguistic turn” of the first half of the 20
th
 century, but it 
similarly connotes quite adequately a feel of retrieving. Sheets-
Johnstone’s works represent a desire to uncover a more original 
understanding of and enquiry into life. One of the most praiseworthy 
features of her 30 years-long philosophical enterprise is its consistent 
obsession with constructing new perspectives on these issues rather than 
being involved with the topics as they stand. Consequently, the 
interdisciplinary reader The Corporeal Turn and her recent articles alike 
are truly works of a philosopher: they explore before giving answers. 
Unfortunately, this kind of writing has its downsides, since it often cannot 
provide readymade methods or answers that can be taken over by others. 
Sheets-Johnstone’s writings deal with a remarkably wide array of 
topics within philosophy, biology, cultural studies, and even neuroscience. 
With a total of nearly 400 pages, The Corporeal Turn cannot be said to 
make many substantial scientific contributions to any of these areas. Its 
sole purpose is to reconsider how we should look at life prior to engaging 
ourselves in dogmatic empirical research. This should make Sheets-
Johnstone’s work of great importance to any philosopher or scientist 
interested in first person methodology.  
Without pretending to discuss The Corporeal Turn and her more 
recent articles in full detail, I here focus on two themes that I deem the 
most interesting from an embodied point of view: “corporeal concepts” 
and “kinetic semantics,” the domains of thought and language 
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respectively. The first appears to fit neatly the contemporary trend to 
consider cognitive capacities in relation to the body and the external 
world—compare, for instance, extended mind theory, the enactive 
approach, embodied and embedded cognition. Of these “four Es,” Sheets-
Johnstone’s approach might be closest to the enactive approach as it is 
recently spelled-out by Thompson. The important similarity here is the 
extension of phenomenological thought along the lines of evolutionary 
biology. What this means is that Sheets-Johnstone applies Husserl’s 
“lonewolf autophenomenology” (Dennett) beyond its alleged solipsism, 
thus leading her to revise the very concepts of biological life, semantics 
and consciousness. 
 
I. Animate Forms and the First Person Perspective 
Central to all of Sheets-Johnstone’s writings are the 
interchangeable concepts “animation,” “aliveness,” or “animate forms.” 
These terms have an important epistemological function as they denote the 
objects of description throughout her works. An animate form is said to be 
a living creature from the perspective of its own active, responsive, and 
dynamic aliveness. The words animate and animation may be understood 
as roughly synonymous to the concept of a living body, which in turn 
stands in the sharpest opposition to objective bodies as described in 
physical or mechanistic research. Even the biological body, although its 
description permits that it breathes, moves and the more, is considered an 
abstraction in that its first person world is stripped from it. The reality 
described from a biological perspective is an observed rather than a lived 
presence. This lived presence, although unaccounted for from a 
mechanical perspective, must nevertheless be assumed by the objective 
researcher. No matter what kind of a body is being investigated, a lived 
body must implicitly be taken to underlie it. Contrary to other descriptive 
concepts, the living body is the one that has been there from birth 
onwards, and, one might add, it is the one that eventually came to invent 
the mechanical and biological bodies.  
In spite of its apparent indefiniteness, the concept is said to 
accentuate certain features of life. Animate forms are above all 
experiencing, responsive, feeling, and moving bodies. In her more recent 
works, Sheets-Johnstone seems to prioritize movement over feeling, 
implying that the latter is both contingent as dependent on kinesthesia. In 
The Corporeal Turn, however, these qualities are said together to 
constitute a primordial dynamic aliveness. This dynamic aliveness points 
to the combined capacities of feeling and moving in pre-objective, 
responsive ways. It incorporates such notions as tactility, kinesthesia,
1
 
                                                          
1
 The term kinesthesia is used to denote the sense a creature has for detecting its own 
bodily position and the movements of its bodily parts. 








 all of which correspond to specific 
characteristics of first-person experience. Sheets-Johnstone thinks that 
understanding the primacy of dynamics requires that one grasps that for 
most part, and in a truly non-metaphoric sense, thinking is movement. 
Being a former dance choreographer, she uses dance improvisation as an 
example to illustrate this. To move creatively in an improvisational dance 
means to respond to movements of others according to some possible sets 
of rules. However, in experiencing some particular sharpness in specific 
body angles of another dancer, one does not perceive or register some 
“sense data” prior to one’s own responsiveness. Neither is there any 
“mind-doing” prior to or even separate from a body-doing. Rather, 
qualities and presences of the other dancer are kinesthetically felt and 
absorbed smoothly and directly into one’s own corporeal aliveness. It 
would in fact be improper to speak of objective notions such as sense data 
in considering these primitive, bodily interactions. According to Sheets-
Johnstone (see her recent paper “From Movement to Dance”), the case of 
dance improvisation is but unique: it represents a typical and universal 
mode of first person aliveness shared by all animate forms. It illustrates 
the dynamic and immediately meaningful environment in which animate 
forms are always already engaged and with which they form a dynamic 
unity.  
Two additional examples may help to illustrate Sheets-Johnstone’s 
radical thesis in which movement and thinking are equated: the Husserlian 
notion of if/then-relationships and the (also Husserlian) passive 
explication of objects through typical familiarity (Husserl, Experience and 
Judgment 103-148). Sheets-Johnstone says that if/then-relationships are 
essentially pre-linguistic but nevertheless conceptual understandings of 
relationships. This combination is somewhat unusual and can really only 
be maintained by broadening our notion of conceptual thinking beyond 
our typical—and similarly beyond Husserl’s—usage of it. Perhaps it 
would be more faithful to Husserl’s intentions to say that the pre-
constitution of the logical structure of the conditional essentially does not 
require any logical capabilities. An if/then-relationship as pre-
linguistically and pre-predicatively constituted may take the shape of 
something like: “if I move my face toward this glass of water, I will be 
able to drink it.” This particular relational apprehension—and also the 
silently achieved passive explication of the glass of water as an object of 
perceptual experience—may count as essentially non-linguistic. The 
activity does not require any “mental activity” but is said to count as 
thinking nonetheless, as a “kinetic bodily logos” (Sheets-Johnstone, 
                                                          
2
 Sensory-kinetics points to the functional unity of sense perception on the one hand, and 
movement of one’s own body, on the other. 
3
 Proprioception means a sense for what is one’s own. 
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Corporeal Turn 33-34, 53-59), involving kinesthetic participation in a 
dynamic environment and proprioceptive knowledge of one’s own body. It 
is this living and thinking body that can form the basis for any kind of 
“post-kinetic” symbolism, i.e., language. Thinking, it is thus argued, is 
essentially a matter of movement, not of (human) language, and as a result 
it is not restricted to the mental.  
 
II. Animate Evolution, Corporeal Concepts and Kinetic Semantics 
It is an essential part of Sheets-Johnstone’s project that it combines 
the phenomenological views on the proper descriptive concept for life 
with an acceptance of the validity of empirical history. By the introduction 
of a historical dimension, the notion of animate forms is significantly 
enriched. It might seem as if our understanding of the behavior of animate 
forms would be led wrongly into the direction of third person research. 
However, taking the course of the historical development of life into 
account does not imply that the subject matter would be reduced to mere 
mechanisms in the theory of evolution. Rather, it means we ought to 
reconsider the very meaning of evolution as a natural process.  
The importance of Darwinian evolution for a phenomenology of 
existential forms can be illustrated by means of Sheets-Johnstone’s 
concept of “existential fit.” For the early Merleau-Ponty, evolutionary 
continuities between human and non-human animals are located in and 
thereby restricted to certain “vital categories.” These categories are 
understood as fundamental biological dimensions, such as desiring food or 
sexual reproduction. According to Sheets-Johnstone, reducing 
evolutionary continuities to a mere set of vital categories will ensure the 
unique position of human beings on evolutionary scales. This in turn leads 
to implicit discontinuities in evolutionary thinking. Merleau-Ponty 
allegedly fails to be concerned with the unique adaptation of animals to 
their environment. For him, eating is a vital category and as a result, all 
eating is always plain eating—regardless of the fact that a chimp might eat 
more than a gorilla but less than a human. Consequently, these differences 
within the vital categories are held irrelevant for evolutionary differences 
in degree. To put it differently, by downgrading evolutionary continuities 
to supposed vital categories of which the exact structure is unimportant, 
Merleau-Ponty would neglect the unique existential fit each creature has to 
its environment and implicitly allow for a superior status of mankind. The 
notion of existential fit might help to overcome this conceptual gap by 
paving the way for a new understanding of evolutionary history. 
Sheets-Johnstone thinks a natural history of animate forms should 
begin with the most primordial faculty of animate dynamics, namely with 
surface sensitivity—the sensate faculty intrinsic to all animation at all 
times. The importance of surface sensitivities simply cannot be 




overestimated: it is through it that the most primary tactile-kinesthetic 
engagements with the world take place. As with Aristotle, it is through 
touch only that meaningful affectivities become immediately manifest 
without mediation. Through pressure, sensate contact deforms animate 
forms. External proprioceptors are said to be the most basic surface organs 
responsible for a creature’s ability to know that it gets deformed. This 
corresponds to empirical observations of hydrozoa or polyps. These 
formal deformations and the creature’s subsequent responsiveness—that 
is, its feeling and moving—take central stage in the evolution of 
consciousness. 
Proprioceptive knowledge through deformations constitutes what 
the author calls a “meta-corporeal consciousness” which may even apply 
to protozoa.
4
 Sheets-Johnstone thinks there is no reason not to speak of the 
cognitive abilities of a unicellular bacterium: “cognitive capacities cannot 
reasonably be reserved only for what are commonly termed higher-order 
organisms” (Corporeal Turn 161). From the perspective of a natural 
history of animate forms, a bacterium’s ability to know certain chemical 
properties of its surroundings and thereby to know whether it should move 
or not, count as genuine meta-corporeal knowledge.  
Using impressive amounts of biological data, Sheets-Johnstone 
attempts to further support the thesis that consciousness is essentially a 
corporeal phenomenon grounded in movement. She suggests that the 
external proprioceptors of simple animate forms used for acquiring basic 
corporeal knowledge through bodily deformations might have evolved 
toward internal sensors in more advanced animate forms, such as we find 
in lobsters and spiders (140). From basic tactility in protozoa, kinesthesia 
gradually evolved further and from there advanced into sensitivity to 
movement through internally mediated systems of corporeal awareness. 
Despite these changes, two constant factors remain throughout these 
evolutionary developments. Firstly, the primacy of surface sensitivity with 
regard to a creature’s kinesthetic abilities, and secondly, the shared goal 
this serves in all animate bodies: a basic movement-sensitive corporeal 
consciousness. The reality of our own selves, thus perceived, is rooted in 
this bodily consciousness. To focus on a natural history of animate forms 
means to reconsider consciousness in its evolutionary context—not as 
humanly privileged, but as a bodily phenomenon. 
This historical overview may seem to make its points too hastily. It 
is hard to conceive of the possibility to trace all those elements we 
ordinarily conceive of as constituting human consciousness—e.g., 
thought, concepts, intelligence, and awareness—to the dynamics of sense 
and movement. A brief example might again help to illustrate how Sheets-
                                                          
4
 Protozoa are a phylum of organisms within the kingdom of protista. They are typically 
unicellular organisms, often with locomotive abilities. 
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Johnstone thinks this to be possible. We ordinarily consider concepts such 
as weight only with respect to their objective use. For instance, we use it 
to numerically express a particular objective property of a given object or 
in roughly weighing something in our hands in order to thematically 
apprehend the approximate weight of an object. However, this thematic 
activity of consciously weighing something and the objective expression 
often related to this are really only exceptional cases. We should first 
notice that the experience of smoothness, softness, weight, heat, distance, 
and so forth occur prior to the corresponding linguistic expressions and 
similarly before being intentionally thematized. These concepts are an 
integral part of our bodily life—of our own lives, but also of infants yet 
unable to speak and of non-human animals. To experience smoothness or 
roughness does not require the acquisition of language skills, that is to say: 
they are corporeal concepts.  
In spite of the capacity for corporeal concepts, most animate forms 
obviously do not attain language during the course of their lives. They do, 
however, have their own meaningful worlds with particular regularities, 
variations, and daily interactions with other animate forms. All such 
modes of structuring are in a general sense referred to by Sheets-Johnstone 
as corporeal concepts. These primitive, unthematic concepts such as 
insideness, thickness, near, far, journey, balance, orientation, and force are 
the necessary condition for a conceptual language (221). To stress their 
strong embodiment, Sheets-Johnstone also calls them “archetypal 
corporeal-kinetic forms.” Whether we hold these archetypes to be actual 
concepts or not is a matter of terminology. Sheets-Johnstone, however, 
thinks it necessary to call them conceptual as she would otherwise support 
a metaphysical gap between semantics and movement and thus implicitly 
favor evolutionary discontinuities. 
Corporeal concepts and archetypal corporeal-kinetic forms are 
bodily concepts that structure the perception of animate forms. In order to 
build her way up toward symbolic semantics, an intercorporeal, pre-
semantic communication is required. The long and somewhat unattractive 
term “species-specific/tactile-kinesthetic possibilities and invariants” is to 
fill the gap (225). According to Sheets-Johnstone, animate forms of the 
same species share a more or less similar living body with comparable 
archetypal corporeal-kinetic forms. Not just their experiences of the world 
are alike: their very own bodies are to a high degree similar. The fact that 
these creatures have such similar bodies means that they also have shared 
tactile-kinesthetic possibilities: that is, they act upon their worlds in a 
similar way, utilizing the same resources and acting similarly upon 
possibilities present to them. In these shared tactile-kinesthetic 
possibilities we now find the very foundation for intercorporeal 
communication. Given one’s own corporeal concepts and tactile-
kinesthetic possibilities and given the fact that other creatures share these 




in highly similar ways, a first foundation can be laid for a kinetic 
semantics.  
Kinetic semantics requires a making co-present of meaning. 
Sheets-Johnstone writes: “species-specific/tactile-kinesthetic possibilities 
and invariants are the foundation of our capacity to apperceive what is not 
present” (226). Indeed, apperception, in the Husserlian tradition of 
phenomenology, is the ability to perceive what is not directly present. A 
common example is the perception of a table which one grasps as a single 
persisting object when walking around it. The crux here is that even 
though the table is always at any instance perceived from only one angle, 
it is understood as a whole at any of those instances. In other words, the 
table’s other sides are made co-present in perception. Analogously, in 
order to grasp symbolic or iconic meaning, the ability to apperceive 
something more than is actually given seems an absolute necessity. 
Sheets-Johnstone thinks an intercorporeal understanding is based on a 
combination of apperception with species-specific/tactile-kinesthetic 
possibilities. For instance, the success of communicating a particular 
threat display is not dependent on any “translation” of “information” 
hidden somewhere in the mind of the other creature. As in the dance 
improvisation analogy, there is no mediation or representation going on 
here: the threatened creature does not need to infer the meaning of the 
expression. It is only a common kinetic dynamic grasped immediately on 
grounds of a shared body and shared knowledge about the world. Facial 
displays are communicable precisely because they are structured in bodily 
movement and experiences shared by the relevant animate forms. As 
Crease justly puts it, the important fact that each of us is a body provides 
us with a fundamental and unsurpassable commonality. 
 
III. Discussion 
Sheets-Johnstone’s point of departure seems to be essentially 
Husserlian: every objective description of the body must already assume a 
subjective correlate of lived experience in which the objective description 
and the object itself to which it pertains are constituted (Husserl, Ideas 
105-112). However, theoretically speaking, things are bound to get more 
complicated in at least two ways. First, Sheets-Johnstone applies 
phenomenology to creatures that I myself am not. Second, she uses 
empirically yielded data to support and even justify the primacy of the 
living body, while paradoxically holding that the former is the invention of 
the latter. This second problem points to the somewhat obscure relation 
between empiricism and phenomenological analyses in her works. A 
further exploration of this relation is required if one wishes to clarify the 
phylogenetic development of structures of phenomenal consciousness 
- 163 - 





which we take to be foundational to our own mental and linguistic 
capacities. 
To start with the first problem: I was quite surprised to notice that, 
in discussing this topic with friends and colleagues, there was an almost 
unanimous skepticism toward the possibility of a proper descriptive 
concept of a life that is not based on a reductive objectivism altogether. 
The dominant line of reasoning appeared to be the following: one may 
have access to one’s own experiential life, but this does not mean that one 
can assume the possibility of acquiring knowledge concerning the 
experience of others. In other words, there seems to be a fundamental 
difference between looking at objects as objective and subjective 
respectively, in that the objective object would be unambiguously 
accessible for me whereas the subjective, intentional being of the object is 
beyond my experience. Even though this is a common line of reasoning 
today, I sincerely doubt its validity. Firstly, one could appeal to the fact 
that the world of one’s own subjective experiences, allegedly the most 
certain, is in fact dependent in all ways on the assumption of the subjective 
worlds of others. One’s own world is essentially determined by one’s 
sensing and moving, but equally by the world’s response to this. That 
others must have experiences like mine is supported by the fact that I 
would not have had my world the way it is without these subjects having 
their similar worlds that have co-determined mine in their responsiveness 
to me. The experiences of the other for the other is thus in a way 
prerequisite to or co-determinate for my own experiences for me. 
Secondly, a more technical argument would be that the subjective being of 
the object I experience consists of apperceptive qualities of that object 
which are similarly required for constituting the objective object. It could 
be argued, then, that the subjective and the objective being of an object of 
my experience hold a very similar validity in their existence for me, since 
both are to the same extent made possible only on the basis of a complex 
of apperceptions and horizons. 
However, Sheets-Johnstone’s recurring argument seems to concern 
the ontological primacy of the subjective over the objective, which is also 
reflected in her recent claims on the relation between movement and 
mirror neurons: “If there were no such thing as corporeal-kinetic tactile-
kinesthetic invariants, there would be no mirror neurons” (“Movement and 
Mirror Neurons” 387). One could argue against this that it is clearly 
insufficient to merely have a similar body if one is to apperceive the 
other’s emotional disposition in a particular facial display. Indeed, for a 
genuine apprehension of the other’s “state of mind” one needs an 
understanding in the form of some kind of empathy that exceeds mere 
intercorporeality. In short, this means that mirror neurons as physiological 
entities would still have to be presupposed for the actual understanding of 
the other. I think it is senseless to wage tactile-kinesthetic invariants as 




subjective conditions against mirror neurons as objective conditions. The 
question Sheets-Johnstone has to address does not concern factual origins, 
for the subjective cannot be factually or empirically prior to the objective: 
to ask for such foundational relations is to confuse two ontologies. She 
only has to argue that subjective ontology is necessary for explaining life 
next to the objective principles of the reductive sciences. In other words, a 
final explanation of evolutionary developments cannot exist solely of 
mirror neurons: it has to take the first person perspective into account.  
The second problem stated earlier concerns the use of empirical 
data from evolutionary biology, ethology, and other disciplines for the 
support of first person descriptions. What methods of inference will ensure 
that our descriptions of intentional structures, corporeal concepts, and the 
like will be correct in a domain of existence that cannot be experienced for 
itself? Even if all animals are indeed animated, this does not yet give us 
any clues on how to investigate animate forms that we ourselves are not. 
One could again argue that the subjective being of an object for me is, 
philosophically speaking, not more obscure than is the objective being of 
the same object. However, this does not quite weigh up against a whole 
tradition of objective sciences still dominating today’s scientific 
landscape. It is highly regrettable that Sheets-Johnstone does not discuss 
these fundamental problems anywhere in her recent works. The relation 
between empiricism and phenomenology remains opaque while no 
concrete models, methods, or guidelines for studying the structures of 
experiences alien to ourselves are being offered. In spite of the seriousness 
of these objections, I think that we find similar problems in other methods 
that involve first person data. Sheets-Johnstone faces the same theoretical 
difficulties as those qualitative research methods based on phenomenology 
in the areas of psychology and the humanities, such as interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (see Osborn & Smith) and empirical 
phenomenology (see Aspers). The only difference is the object of 
investigation: humans in the case of psychology, and non-humans in 
biology. These concerns, then, do not at all have to stop us from pursuing 
this new line of phenomenology. They should, however, be dealt with one 
way or another. 
Guided by our Cartesian instincts we tend to be weary of thinkers 
like Sheets-Johnstone who transgress the limits of objective science and 
delve into a new domain of the same reality. As the founder of 
phenomenology once wrote, we tend to spare ourselves the effort of 
exploring the new lands by pointing to methodical difficulties from the 
sideline, neglecting that these and similar problems also occur in one’s 
own field of research. I think Sheets-Johnstone has made some important 
contributions in her 30 yearlong project focused on the lived dynamics of 
the body. However, in order to translate the numerous perspectives and 
ideas into one or more unified methods, much more collaborative research 
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between phenomenological philosophers and scientists is necessary. 
Undoubtedly, objective measures reflecting subjective ontology would 
have to be developed to account for the interactions of animate forms with 
their environment. Some of the analyses conducted in chapter 7, 
“Consciousness: A Natural History,” might have a high potential for 
further elaborations in this direction, but for the most part these paths have 
yet to be paved. However, if the reader finds it convincing that animation 
is the appropriate descriptive concept for life, he or she will have to take 
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